Nationalise Minerals, Fix Housing ✅

Introduction – Reclaiming What’s Ours

Under our vast red soils and rugged outback lies a visible paradox: Australia’s mineral wealth is immense, yet most of it ends up in foreign pockets rather than funding homes for Australian families.

Meanwhile, over half of low‑income Australians remain in persistent housing stress. It’s time to ask a question:

what if our mineral assets were harnessed to build the homes we desperately need?

Australia's housing supply and affordability issue has become a defining feature of the last decade. Government targets call for 1.2 million new homes over five years, yet projections show we’ll miss this by up to nearly 400,000 dwellings by 2029

On top of that, a national deficit nearing 640,000 social and affordable homes looms large—draining economic opportunity, entrenching inequality, and consigning too many Australians to unstable housing situations

Against this backdrop, mining profits have been pouring out of WA and across the nation, funnelled mostly to multinational shareholders. Australia’s minerals sector—worth over 10% of GDP and powering $270 billion in export revenue—is 86% foreign‑owned, with giants like BHP and Rio Tinto capturing the lion’s share of profit.

Meanwhile, legislative decisions prioritise budget deficits and private wealth accumulation through housing investment growth, rather than surplus or smart public investment. The result? A phenomenon where houses double as financial assets, not just places to live—a dynamic that further squeezes first‑home buyers and renters alike.

Enter a big idea: nationalise Australia’s minerals, especially in WA, reclaim control over the wealth beneath our feet, and redirect it into a sovereign-style fund designed to finance massive housing builds.

Imagine what could happen if we treated our minerals like Norway treats oil: rather than fleeting profit, we build a national legacy—homes, stability, and nationwide prosperity.

In this post, we’ll lay out:

The scale of our housing shortfall, with numbers that keep us awake at night.
How Norway turned oil into housing and public wealth, and what we can learn.
Legal and practical paths to nationalisation within Australia’s existing framework.
A roadmap: mineral profits → housing fund → homes.
Strong responses to common objections—from “it’ll scare investors” to “it’s legally impossible.”
And ultimately, why nationalising minerals isn’t radical—it’s revolutionary in the best way for Australian families.

We’ll also discuss how past privatisations left Australians paying monopoly prices, and why energy-smart construction—not distant net-zero headlines—should headline our spending priorities.

📸 If mining companies want a louder voice in politics, then it’s only fair we put their mineral leases under the spotlight. We’re in a national emergency, so nothing should be off-limits. Let’s talk about these big money-makers and how they can start working for all Australians—not just the leaseholders.

💡

Over half of low‑income Australians live in persistent housing stress—and with projections showing we’ll miss our housing target by nearly 400,000 dwellings by 2029, the status quo is failing us

Australia’s Housing Shortfall—Earthquake Warnings

Australia is teetering on the edge of a housing catastrophe. The federal government set a goal to build 1.2 million new homes by 2029, yet current forecasts show we'll fall well short—by up to 400,000 homes. In capital cities alone, the shortfall could reach approximately 393,000 dwellings by 2029. That’s almost an entire missing city.

📉 The Numbers That Break The Bedrock

National shortfall: Roughly 400,000 homes are expected to be missing by 2029 .
Short-term decline: NHFIC projects a cumulative deficit of about 106,300 dwellings by 2027—and a broader shortfall of 377,600 homes when factoring in homelessness, social, and affordable housing.
Affordable housing gap: Advocacy groups, like Everybody’s Home, estimate a national shortage of 640,000 social/affordable homes.

💸 Who Is Bearing The Brunt?

The result is alarming housing stress: over 1 million low‑income households (households in the bottom 40% of income) spend more than 30% of their income on rent or mortgage—putting them in financial hardship. Renters are especially squeezed—about 58% of low-income renters report spending over 30% of their income on housing .

But stress isn’t limited to low-income households. An ABC survey indicates that up to 75% of renters and 67% of all households feel the financial pinch of housing affordability—and the situation is driving strong impacts on mental health . Meanwhile, homelessness is broader than most imagine: up to 3 million Australians are considered at risk—whether through insecure housing, couch surfing, or public housing waitlists.

🏗️ Why Is This Happening?

Three core dynamics are at play:

Demand far exceeds supply: We’re completing only ~135,640 homes per year in capitals—well short of the 240,000 needed to meet demand consistently.
Population growth intensifies pressure: Net migration is over a million people between 2023–28—creating demand for about 223,000 new homes yearly .
Housing-as-investment dominance: With deficit budgets, investors have flooded into housing as a store of wealth. The result? Money that should’ve built homes or infrastructure gets parked in property to earn capital gains across the next 5–10 years.

🤔 Imagine this scenario:

Without intervention, Australia keeps building only 135,000 homes a year while demand grows. Home prices and rents rise indefinitely, more families are priced out, and blockbuster government deficits remain tied to interest costs and welfare band‑aids.

Now flip the script:

What if an additional 100,000 homes were built annually? We'd close the affordability gap within a few years, stabilise rent, and reduce stress—and all through public investment fuelled by national resource wealth. It’s not just possible; it’s the logical counterfactual given our economic capacity.

💡

By 2029, Australia is projected to be short nearly 400,000 homes—including 640,000 social/affordable dwellings—leaving over a million low-income households in housing stress and fueling a mental health crisis.

Australia’s Housing Shortfall — Earthquake Warnings

Australia is facing an escalating housing crisis—within five years, we could be missing nearly half a million homes in our capital cities alone. A 2025 report by the Urban Development Institute of Australia (UDIA) projects a 393,000-dwelling shortfall across capital cities by 2029, despite the national target of 1.2 million new homes. That’s the equivalent of an entire city disappearing.

📊 The Current Numbers

National deficit of ~400,000 homes: UDIA estimates a 393,000 shortfall by 2029.
Shortfall of up to 460,000 homes: Other industry projections suggest even further gaps—around 462,000 by 2029.
Affordable/social housing shortage (~640,000): Advocacy groups like Everybody’s Home report 640,000 households in need of genuinely affordable or social housing.

🏘️ Who’s Running Out of Homes?

Low-income households: Over 1 million low-income families are in housing stress—spending more than 30% of income on housing costs .
Broader affordability pain: 75% of renters and 67% of households say they’re struggling with housing costs, with clear links to mental health distress .
Homelessness risk: Around 3 million Australians are currently experiencing or at risk of homelessness, according to advocacy groups.

🛠️ What’s Driving This Crisis?

Supply lags behind demand
- In 2024, only ~135,640 new homes were completed in our capital cities—well below the consistent need for ~240,000/year
Record-high population growth
- Net migration adds over a million people between 2023–28, increasing demand for around 223,000 new homes annually
Housing as wealth storage
- With governments running deficits, investors have turned housing into an asset rather than a necessity. This inflates home prices, driving up mortgages and rents for everyone.

💭 What if , What-About Scenario

Without intervention: If we continue at current build rates (~135,000/year) while demand climbs, home prices and rents will keep rising, worsening affordability, increasing homelessness, and burdening government budgets with emergency costs rather than sustainable investment.
With nationalisation-driven intervention: Redirecting just 100,000 extra homes/year funded via nationalised mineral profits could eliminate the shortfall within five years. That could stabilise prices, reduce stress, and transform housing from wealth asset back into a universal need.

💡

By 2029, Australia could be short nearly 400,000 homes in our capital cities—and even more if current trends continue, leaving over a million low-income households under housing stress. Construction rates would need to nearly double to avoid the shortfall, but without radical new revenue, that’s simply not happening

3. The $700,000‑Per‑Home Math

Let’s break this down with numbers that hit home (literally): 

Housing Element	Estimated Cost (AUD)
House + land package	$700,000
Estimated national shortfall	~400,000 homes
Total cost to close gap	$280 billion

That’s the ticket: $280 billion needed to build the homes we're officially short by 2029.

🧠 How Mining Revenue Measures Up

Mining isn't small-change. Western Australia, our mining powerhouse, provides serious public returns:

In 2023‑24, mining royalties alone brought in $11.2 billion—the single-largest revenue source in the WA state budget
Overall, mining has underpinned surpluses for six years running, contributing about 26.5% of general government revenue.
Nationally, minerals and energy exports are worth approximately $413 billion, contributing about $64 billion in taxes and royalties in 2021‑22.

But most of this is still private profit—much of it channelled overseas.

🔁 Redirecting Just a Slice of Mining Profits

What if Australia recaptured just 20% of existing mineral royalties and taxes from WA?

20% of 11.2 billion = $2.24 billion/year
If scaled nationally, and with similar returns, that number could hit $10 billion/year

At $10 billion per year, closing a $280 billion gap would take 28 years—too long.

But what if we became more ambitious? The Norway model suggests governments can claim up to 78% of resource-sector rents:

50% national share = $5.6 billion/year from WA alone
Across Australia, that figure would likely double—bringing $10–12 billion annually

To close $280 billion over 10 years, we need ~$28 billion annually in redirected revenues—an aggressive but achievable target if we significantly scale our take from mineral profits.

🧠 Filling the Housing Gap

Without change: We continue to fall behind—$400 billion+ needed, deficits keep growing, housing stress intensifies.
With nationalisation and scaled revenue capture:
1. Redirect ~$28B/year to public housing.
2. Build 40,000 new homes/year (at $700k each).
3. Fill the full 400,000-home gap in under 10 years.
4. Stabilise prices and rents, reduce housing stress, inject productivity back into communities.

This isn’t fantasy—it’s a back-of-the-envelope thinking rooted in existing revenue streams. By nationalising minerals to reclaim profits, Australia could leverage its natural wealth for public housing—turning red soil into bricks, mortar, and opportunity.

💡

📊 At $700k per home, Australia's 400,000-home shortfall requires $280 billion—a funding gap that could be filled within a decade if we redirected 50% of WA’s mining royalties ($5.6B/year) and scaled up nationally.

4. Lessons from Norway’s Oil Wealth

Australia has long admired Norway’s ability to turn its oil reserves into a lasting national asset. While we’re aiming to learn from, not replicate, every detail of Norway’s model, the fundamental principles carry an undeniable lesson: it’s not just what you have—it’s how you use it.

🇳🇴 The Norwegian Model: Key Pillars

High resource taxation
Since the 1990s, Norway has taxed oil and gas at about 78%—that’s 55% rent tax on top of the standard 22% corporate tax. In contrast, Australia reaps only around 9–10% from its fossil fuel sector .
Sovereign Wealth Fund (SWF)
Norway established its Government Pension Fund Global in the early 1990s. As of March 2025, it holds roughly US $1.74 trillion—about $340,000 per person, making it the world’s largest SWF.
Fiscal discipline
Only the investment returns—not the principal—are used to fund annual government budgets, capped at around 3% per year.
Ethical investment and transparency
The fund is known for its ethical restrictions (e.g. no nuclear weapons, coal), plus extremely high levels of transparency and public accountability.

🧮 Real Results: What Norway Achieves

Per-capita wealth: Approximately AU $350,000 per person in the fund as of 2023 .
Annual returns: Around 6.3%, delivering ~$180 billion USD in returns just in 2023.
Policy impact: Fund stability allows Norway to invest in social programs, manage economic fluctuations, and give citizens a direct stake in their natural wealth.

By contrast, Australia collects only a small fraction of mining revenue—and lacks a central mechanism to transform windfalls into public good.

🔁 What If Australia Followed Norway?

Tax take: Boosting resource rent capture to 50–70%—similar to Norway—could add $50–60 billion per year
Institutional vehicle: A Housing Sovereign Wealth Fund (HSWF) funded by mining revenue could become a permanent fixture—capable of investing hundreds of billions in housing and public infrastructure.
Long-term benefit: Over time, Australia could replicate Norway’s legacy-building: a fund worth a trillion dollars or more, providing sustainable revenue long after resource extraction ends.

This model isn’t hypothetical: independent analysis shows Australia could gain up to $66 billion annually if its resource rent capture matched Norway’s effectiveness prosper.org.au.

✅ Why It’s Not Radical—It’s Strategic

Proven worldwide: Many nations—including Canada, UAE, and Chile—employ SWFs to stabilise resource revenues and support long-term planning.
Australia already owns the resources: State and federal governments manage mineral rights under Crown land—centralising revenue isn’t a legal moonshot .
An ideological shift: This isn’t socialism—it’s good governance. It’s about fairness, intergenerational equity, and treating minerals as a shared public trust.

💡

Norway’s oil fund, worth roughly US $1.7 trillion (~AUD $2.5 trillion, ~$340,000 per person) and formed via a 78% resource rent tax, shows what is possible when a nation truly harnesses its resources for public long-term benefit .

5. Mining’s Profit Leak & WA Spotlight

Australia's mineral wealth is undeniable—but too much of it slips offshore. Nowhere is this clearer than in Western Australia, our mining powerhouse.

🌍 Foreign Ownership & Profit Exportation

The Australian oil and gas industry sees the public netting only 9.8% of export revenue—compared to Norway’s 64% take via high taxation and state ownership.
Prosper Australia's report estimates that if Australia taxed and structured mining revenues like Norway, governments could capture up to $66 billion more annually.
WA’s mining landscape is heavily foreign-owned. That means profits—especially from high-value commodities like iron ore—exit our shores, benefiting international shareholders rather than Australian households.

💰 WA’s Royalties: Big Numbers, Bigger Questions

Mining royalties in WA reached $11.2 billion in 2023–24, making up 26.5% of state revenue and powering a $3.2 billion surplus
Iron ore royalty continued to dominate (~83% of all royalties) while lithium, gold, and nickel collectively added hundreds of millions .
Despite these surpluses, most of the wealth remains in private hands—notwithstanding existing schemes like Royalties for Regions, which directs only a small share (~9%) toward regional infrastructure

🎯 Reclaiming Mineral Revenue

Current reality: Billions flow out of WA via profits and dividends—benefiting international companies while affordability worsens at home.

What if:

50% of WA’s royalties ($5.6B) were redirected each year to a "WA Housing Trust".
Expanded nationwide, we could channel $10–12B annually into public housing, infrastructure, and planning reforms.
Houses are built, shortfalls are closed, rents stabilise—and public money stays in Australia.

By reclaiming our mineral wealth, we finance homes and sharpen control over national assets.

💡

WA’s mining royalties totaled $11.2 billion in 2023–24 (≈26.5% of state revenue), yet only a small percentage goes into public infrastructure. Redirecting just half of that could unlock $5.6 billion per year for housing solutions—enough to change the face of housing in WA and beyond.

6. Nationalisation: Strategic, not Radical

It’s time to re-frame nationalisation—not as a left-wing radical step, but as a legally grounded, strategically minded response to housing and wealth inequality—right here in Australia.

⚖️ Mineral Rights and Crown Power

All minerals belong to the Crown
Under Australian law, mineral ownership is vested in state governments, even when the surface land is privately owned. In Western Australia, the Mining Act 1978 clearly states that sub-surface minerals remain Crown property unless legally transferred.
Crown land lease mechanisms exist
Mining firms operate under leases or licences granted for a fixed term, with rent and obligations enforced by the state. Leases expire—allowing the Crown to control renewal terms, modify royalties, or refuse renewal.
Resumption provisions are built-in
As public landowners, state governments possess resumption rights to revoke leases for greater public benefit, subject to fair compensation. This is a standard legal minefield in Crown land management .

Imagine these powers used to direct mineral profits toward housing instead of private dividends—unleashing billions of dollars for public good.

📉 Asset Examples Show It Works

Australia already runs state‑owned, commercial‑style utilities:

Queensland’s Energex and TasWater handle billions in annual revenue and infrastructure—successfully balancing public welfare with cost—including a major electricity network serving 1.5 million homes.
State Electricity Commission of Victoria (SECV) was built entirely with public capital and policy; revived in 2023 as a state-owned energy player aiming for renewables and reliability.
Electric Light & Power Supply Corporation was nationalised in NSW back in the 1950s, bringing reliable, cost-effective electricity to Sydney during an era of instability

These are not fringe cases—they’re proven mechanisms to deliver large-scale services under public control, with clear economic benefits.

🔁 Counterfactual: Would Markets Collapse?

If nationalisation scared off investment, why did electricity nationalisation lead to better infrastructure and expansion across Victoria and NSW, not withdrawal?
In energy, utilities have performed under public models without wholesale failure—and they still partner with private firms. Nationalisation doesn't shut markets; it regulates them.
Mining lease resumption isn’t exotic, either. Under existing law, leases are limited in duration and conditional on public benefit. Refusing or reshaping extensions is legally supported.

If we didn’t nationalise, minerals continue enriching private shareholders—not building homes. If we did, markets would adapt—but society could be richer, safer, and more secure.

✅ Nationalisation with Governance and Accountability

This isn’t state overreach—it’s disciplined public stewardship:

Balanced, legislated nationalisation – define transparent terms for lease renewal, revenue sharing, and compensation.
Independent Housing Wealth Fund – public board, regular audits, transparent reporting.
Cooperation, not confrontation – private mining companies can bid for service contracts; public equity coexists with built-in community benefits.
Strong oversight – parliamentary committees, independent watchdogs, regular consultations with mining communities and First Nations.

💡

Australian law already vests minerals in the Crown; mining leases are limited, resumable, and revocable. Public sector models like electricity networks (Energex, SECV) demonstrate that state-run, commercially efficient services are not only feasible—they often outperform.

Undoing the Privatisation Mistake — Reverse the “Enshittification” Cycle

Privatising essential assets gave governments a momentary cash sugar-hit, but it lumped Australians with decades of higher bills, poorer service, and monopoly rents.

Cory Doctorow’s term enshittification (also called enpoopification)—the steady degradation of a service once profit-maximising owners replace public purpose with shareholder extraction—now describes far more than Big Tech.

From electricity grids to toll roads, the same pattern repeats: sell, celebrate the windfall, then watch costs soar while taxpayers eventually pick up the tab to keep the lights on.

1. How the Enshittification Cycle Works

Quick windfall: Governments book a one-off sale price that flatters the budget bottom line.
Monopoly pricing: Private owners raise fees or over-invest in “gold-plated” assets to justify regulated returns (e.g. eastern-state electricity networks).
Public backlash & bail-out: When prices, service failures or congestion bite hard enough, taxpayers step back in—through subsidies, price caps, or talk of buy-backs (Sydney toll roads, UK rail, NSW Western Power debate).

2. Case Studies of Privatisation Pain

a. Electricity Networks – Gold-Plated Wires, Gold-Plated Bills

From 2005 to 2015 the value of the National Electricity Market’s poles-and-wires ballooned from roughly $50 billion to $90 billion; the Grattan Institute calculates that up to $20 billion of that spend was unjustified by demand or reliability needs, yet consumers must repay it through regulated charges. “Gold-plating” in NSW and Queensland alone added hundreds of dollars a year to typical power bills—costs households will keep paying for decades.

b. Toll Roads – Transurban’s Perpetual Cash Machine

The private operator Transurban has turned Sydney and Melbourne’s motorway networks into a profit engine, posting a $3.3 billion statutory profit in 2023-24 even as some western-Sydney commuters now spend more than 10 per cent of take-home pay just getting to work. Because toll contracts run for up to half a century, motorists are locked into price escalators that rise faster than wages or inflation.

c. Airports – When Flying Became a Fee Factory

Since Sydney Airport was privatised in 2002, aeronautical charges per passenger have risen about 20 per cent in real terms, helping to lift the airport’s operating margins well above pre-pandemic levels. Former ACCC chair Rod Sims has called it a “textbook example of privatisation gone wrong”, noting that charges at Australia’s privatised airports doubled not long after sale.

d. Telstra – Regional Gaps and Expensive Broadband

Parliamentary inquiries into Telstra’s staged sell-off found that privatisation delivered only “modest” efficiency gains while entrenching high wholesale charges—one reason Australia’s NBN has slower speeds and higher retail prices than many OECD peers. Rural communities still complain that copper maintenance and mobile coverage lag city standards, a gap taxpayers now fund through black-spot subsidies.

e. Commonwealth Bank – Windfall for Investors, Opportunity Lost for Citizens

Selling the Commonwealth Bank raised roughly $8 billion for the federal budget in the 1990s, but the bank now earns that much—and more—every single year. It posted a record $10.2 billion profit in 2023 and another $5.1 billion in the first half of 2024-25 alone. In hindsight, taxpayers traded an enduring income stream for a one-off sugar hit, leaving households to pay higher mortgage margins that feed private dividends.

Across sectors, private owners capture super-profits while households face higher essential-service costs—classic enshittification.

3. Why “Re-Publicising” Makes Economic Sense

Lower prices through non-profit provisioning. State-owned utilities such as Energex still deliver dividends while keeping returns below private benchmarks.
Regulatory savings. Endless price-setting disputes (airports, energy) cost regulators and courts millions; public ownership collapses that overhead.
Strategic control. Owning backbone assets helps deploy new technology (renewables, EV charging) without begging private monopolies for access.

4. Pathways to Undo Privatisation

Buy-backs financed by low-cost bonds (as floated for NSW tolls) with debt serviced from future cash flows—not the taxpayer purse.
Expiry-based resumption. Many electricity and airport leases contain sunset clauses; governments can decline renewal or demand majority equity at rollover.
Legislated public option. Replicate Victoria’s revived State Electricity Commission to compete directly and set benchmarks for private players .

If electricity, toll roads and major airports had remained public, households could have avoided price hikes three to four times CPI since the 1990s, saving hundreds of dollars a year on power and transport. Instead, we are still paying for yesterday’s “budget repair”.

💡

Electricity prices rose 170% between 1995 – 2012—four times faster than inflation—despite promises that privatisation would lower bills. Renationalising key assets can halt the enshittification cycle and put households, not shareholders, first.

Funding Housing—From WA to a National Plan

7.1 Existing Building Blocks We Can Turbo-Charge

Housing Australia Future Fund (HAFF). Legislated in 2023, HAFF holds a $10 billion corpus and targets 40 000 social and affordable dwellings in five years—20 000 social, 20 000 affordable. Round 1 has shortlisted 185 projects totalling about 13 700 homes, one-third of its target, but critics note not a single dwelling has yet broken ground.

NHFIC ➜ Housing Australia. The former NHFIC was re-badged “Housing Australia” in 2024 to broaden its mandate and manage HAFF and Accord facilities.

National Housing Accord. States, industry and super funds have pledged to build 1.2 million well-located homes between July 2024 and June 2029. The Accord’s facilities sit under Housing Australia but have only limited capital compared with projected need.

7.2 WA’s Proof-of-Concept Cash Streams

Royalties for Regions (RfR). WA still quarantines a slice of royalties—historically 25 %—for regional infrastructure. The 2024-25 WA Budget channels $4 billion through RfR, but only a fraction lands in bricks and mortar housing.

Keystart. Since 1989, the state-backed Keystart lender has helped 122 000+ West Australians buy a first home with low-deposit loans—showing government balance-sheet leverage can unlock private construction.

7.3 The Minerals-for-Homes Financing Engine

Australia’s resources and energy exports were worth $413 billion in 2023–24.
Governments collected about $64 billion in company taxes and royalties—roughly 15 % of gross value.
Prosper Australia calculates that aligning our royalty and rent regime with Norway’s could raise an extra $66 billion every year.

Scenario: Divert just 25 % of the additional $66 billion (= $16.5 billion a year) into a ring-fenced Housing Wealth Fund. Combined with HAFF earnings, that almost triples current federal housing capital, enabling ~24 000 extra dwellings a year at today’s $700 k house-and-land price.

7.4 Implementation Road-Map

Minerals Sovereign Wealth & Housing Fund Act (2026). Requires 25-50 % of all state and Commonwealth mining rents to flow to the fund; revenue managed by Future Fund-style board.
Automatic State Top-Ups. WA continues RfR but rebadges part of its royalty flow into the national fund; other states replicate.
Pipeline Alignment. Housing Australia receives predictable, decade-long capital commitments—de-risking builder financing and creating economies of scale.
Transparent Metrics. Annual report to Parliament on dwellings started, cost per home, and regional distribution—mirroring Norway’s fund transparency.

7.5 The "Pay-Off"

Without resource nationalisation, HAFF generates <40 000 homes in five years—barely a dent in the 400 000-home deficit. With it, we unlock $150 billion in extra capital over the same window—enough to fund ~200 000 homes and drag private supply with it.

💡

Redirecting just 25 % of the extra rent Australia could capture under a Norway-style royalty regime (≈ $16 billion p.a.) would triple federal housing capital and finance ~200 000 homes in five years—five times HAFF’s current target.

Rethinking Net-Zero: Put Energy Efficiency First

Australia’s fossil-fuel exports exceeded $413 billion last financial year.

Yet our net-zero roadmap ignores the CO₂ released when those fuels are burned in Tokyo or New Delhi, even though climate damage is global.

Focusing only on domestic cuts lets governments claim progress while shipments of high-carbon fuels keep growing.

2 | Why Efficiency Beats Distant Targets

The International Energy Agency calls energy efficiency the “first fuel” because every avoided kilowatt-hour is cheaper than new supply or offsets. CSIRO modelling shows that renovating or building homes to higher standards can cut household bills 20-40 % and slash peak-day grid demand.

Rewiring Australia finds full household electrification paired with efficiency saves >$4,000 a year on energy and petrol by the early 2030s. These gains arrive in months, not decades.

3 | The 7-Star Code: Proof of Concept

From October 2023, the National Construction Code lifted the minimum energy rating for new homes from 6 to 7 NatHERS stars—a move projected to trim heating-cooling loads by roughly 25 %.

Even conservative cost-benefit tests by state regulators show net savings over a mortgage term, thanks to lower bills. South Australia’s attempt to freeze future code updates for ten years drew howls from insulation and glazing suppliers who warned the moratorium would lock buyers into inefficient, higher-cost homes.

4 | Paying for Efficiency with Resource Windfalls

Redirecting just 25 % of the extra mining rent Australia could capture under a Norway-style regime—about $16 billion a year—would more than cover the incremental cost of building every new social or affordable dwelling to 7-Star (or better) performance.

AHURI’s 2024 work (Source: Page 21, Page 29) shows that energy bills, transport and maintenance are a bigger slice of low-income household budgets than the mortgage itself; energy-smart design directly tackles that burden. Pairing resource revenue with efficiency standards turns climate policy into a cost-of-living policy.

5 | A Measured Transition, Not Moving the Goalposts

Grattan Institute warns that wildly ambitious interim targets can backfire if they out-run practical pathways and public consent. A phased escalation—7 Stars today, electric appliances by 2030, zero-operational-carbon shells by 2035—lets trades, supply chains and households adapt without sticker-shock or political whiplash.

Meanwhile, Canberra’s post-2030 renewables review already signals that timetables will adjust to grid realities.

💡

Scope-3 CO₂ from Australia’s fossil exports is 8× bigger than our entire domestic footprint . Tighten building efficiency and fund it with mining profits, and we cut bills today instead of chasing symbolic net-zero milestones 25 years away.

8. Countering the Biggest Objections

8.1 “It will scare off investment and stall innovation”

State-owned power grids and water utilities already handle multi-billion-dollar networks in Australia while partnering with—rather than excluding—private firms.

Energex, for example, is a 100 % Queensland-government-owned corporation and still attracts private contractors, technology vendors and debt finance without drama.
Victoria’s revived State Electricity Commission (SEC) is raising capital for new renewables without a market exodus.
Overseas, fully state-owned Codelco remains the world’s biggest copper producer, topping BHP’s 2024 volumes while posting a pre-tax profit of US $790 million.

If investors can live with government ownership in energy grids and one of the planet’s largest copper miners, they can live with a Housing-Wealth-Fund model that leaves room for private service contracts and joint ventures.

8.2 “It’s legally impossible—the leases are locked in”

Mineral rights already belong to the Crown.

WA’s Mining Act 1978 states that all minerals on Crown land remain the property of the Crown and that leases are time-limited, subject to renewal at the Minister’s discretion.
The Act also provides explicit resumption and compensation provisions if land is required for “public purposes”.

In short: the legal pathway—resumption at lease expiry or by compensation—is built into the system we already use.

8.3 “State-run enterprises are hopelessly inefficient”

Empirical evidence says otherwise:

TasWater became partly state-owned in 2018; since then it has secured $200 million in fresh capital while maintaining service standards across the island.
Queensland’s network owner Energy Queensland pays regular dividends to the state budget while ranking among the nation’s most reliable electricity distributors.
Victoria’s SEC delivered low-cost power for decades before privatisation; its 2023 reboot aims to repeat that performance for renewables.

Well-regulated, commercially structured public enterprises can—and do—work well.

8.4 “Foreign partners will walk”

Codelco (The National Copper Corporation Of Chile) sells copper to US buyers even amid tariff threats—because the resource itself is strategic and scarce. Investors want access to minerals; they rarely abandon world-class deposits simply because the public gets a larger share of the pie. Norway’s 78 % oil tax hasn’t driven Equinor or BP out of the North Sea—profits are smaller, but returns are still healthy.

8.5 “The budget already gets a fair slice”

Research by Prosper Australia shows states could add $14.5 billion a year just by moving to flexible royalty rates; matching Norway’s approach could capture up to $66 billion extra annually. Given a $280 billion housing-gap price-tag, the current royalty take is clearly not “fair”.

8.6 “Public ownership risks political pork-barrelling”

That danger is real—but manageable:

Norway’s sovereign fund reports every holding and every vote it casts.
Our model would hard-wire transparency: quarterly public accounts, independent audit, and a statutory 3 % draw-down cap—mirroring Norway’s fiscal rule.

💡

Mineral leases are always the Crown’s to grant—or reclaim. WA’s Mining Act even spells out resumption powers and compensation terms, while existing state-owned utilities (Energex, SEC, TasWater) prove public-run, commercially disciplined assets can thrive and still partner with private capital.

10. Conclusion – Reclaim, Build, Belong

Australia’s minerals are a one-time gift; housing is a permanent need. Nationalising resource rents—exactly as Norway did with oil—offers a clear, lawful path to slash the $280 billion housing gap, stabilise rents, and convert export booms into generational security.

From WA’s royalty pipeline to the Housing Australia Future Fund, the governance plumbing is already in place. What’s missing is political nerve, and that only arrives when voters demand it—loudly, repeatedly and armed with facts.

Reclaim mineral rents (nationalisation).
Reverse costly privatisations (undo enshittification).
Re-invest in energy-efficient, affordable homes—cutting bills while Scope-3 export emissions keep rising

💡

If Australia matched Norway’s rent-capture rate, up to $66 billion a year could flow to public coffers—more than six times the Housing Australia Future Fund’s entire corpus.

FAQS

Is nationalisation legal? Absolutely. Minerals belong to the Crown, and the state can resume leases with compensation. It’s the same principle governments use when they acquire homes at fair-market value for highway expansions—only this time the policy would apply to mining leases.
Will investment dry up? State-owned utilities thrive; resources remain attractive because geology trumps ownership.
How much could we raise? Up to $66 b/year by matching Norway’s rent-capture efficiency.
How fast could we build? Redirect $28 b/year → 40 000 homes annually → close the gap in 10 years.
What about mining jobs? Ownership change reallocates dividends, not workforces; operations continue.
Public support? 48 % of West Australians favour higher mining taxes .
Safeguard against pork-barrelling? Norway-style 3 % fiscal rule & quarterly public reporting.
Doesn’t planning reform matter more? Both matter—without capital, approvals alone don’t build homes.
Isn’t $700 k per home too high? It’s the current greenfield-average turnkey price; scaling social housing may lower unit costs over time.

Minerals for Homes: Why Australia Must Nationalise Its Resource